Australia's Missing Nuclear Debate
Australia's Missing Nuclear Debate
Australia needs considerable uplift to support the strengthening of extended nuclear deterrence and offset its potential fraying or failure.
During our scanning of geostrategic events over the last couple of weeks, our eyes were caught by the increasingly tense state of nuclear issues. On 20 August, the New York Times’ David Sanger reported that the Biden Administration had revised its nuclear strategy to better reflect the increasingly complex environment, especially the growing threat from Chinese nuclear development. That, unsurprisingly, triggered Chinese urgings for the United States to ‘abandon its Cold War mentality’. Russia, stung by Ukrainian pushback, is signalling changes to its nuclear doctrine.
Meantime, South Korea is increasingly concerned that the US nuclear umbrella may be waning, increasing public support for its own nuclear weapons. With Iran, in April 2024, then potentially being one to two weeks, rather than months, from possessing sufficient fuel for a nuclear weapon, the most recent call for a Saudi nuclear capability from a prominent Saudi supporter emphasised stabilising regional balances.
Giving the shifting landscape, we thought we’d repost Dr Seebeck’s piece of 4 September 2024 on the implications of those strategic changes for Australia’s nuclear strategy debate—or lack thereof—below. The post was first published on Strategic Analysis Australia.
Recently, the nuclear debate, such as it is in Australia, has been captured by two significant developments.
There are the plans for nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangements. That will entail new skills, capabilities and operational practice on the part of the defence force, technology transfers of exceptionally closely held information from our two partners, and new civilian responsibilities, including the management of material.
And then there’s the proposal from the Opposition to build a civilian nuclear power industry, something that government had earlier ruled out, first as part of the AUKUS arrangements (“We were told that a civil nuclear industry wasn’t necessary to gain access to the nuclear propulsion technology”), then subsequently because it conflicted with the current government’s renewable push and the old, Cold War-era sensibilities of the left.
Both skirt the question of Australia’s fundamental dependence on American extended deterrence underpinning its security and defence strategy.
That has to be recognised and addressed, rather than being distracted by, or conflated with, the other debates. The global nuclear balance and environment has shifted markedly over the last decade, leaving the United States, and by extension Australia, in an increasingly precarious position.
As a starting point, Australian readers would do well to read the 1 August 2024 speech by Dr Vipin Narang, the-then US Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, at the Centre for Strategic and International Security.
Narang makes a strong and sober case for a belated renewal of effort in the US nuclear program:
‘[The United States now finds itself] in nothing short of a new nuclear age, an unprecedented mix of multiple revisionist nuclear challengers who are uninterested in arms control or risk reduction efforts, each rapidly modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals and openly threatening to employ nuclear weapons to achieve their aims.’
Narang’s analysis highlights the increasing weakness in Australian strategic assumptions about the geostrategic environment.
For the first time since 1989, with Putin’s war in Ukraine, the United States, its NATO allies and other allies who are supporting Ukraine, are engaged in a military conflict with a nuclear armed adversary. This is not a Cold War political arm wrestle or a confrontational engagement like we see in the South China Sea, but an active destructive war where Ukraine is able to fight because of US and allied military material support. After its invasion of Ukraine, Russia used the threat of its nuclear weapons to limit support to Ukraine, a reminder that one does not need to explode a nuclear device to use it, and gain value from that use of such weapons’ existence.
Were Russia the only concern, the West may be able to revert to the use of Cold War measures, including traditional arms control, to manage the threat. Russia, albeit nuclear-armed, is not a peer threat in the same way that the old USSR was to the United States. However, China, which is a peer threat, is also expanding, growing and diversifying its nuclear inventory—as Narang notes, with Russian support and supplies. It is likely to possess 1000 warheads by 2030 and has been investigating differing delivery means.
Then there is North Korea, continuing to arm and grow its nuclear arsenal and with it the ability to threaten its neighbours, South Korea and Japan, as well as, increasingly, the United States. North Korea, continually searching for ways to beat sanctions and disrupt its adversaries, is more than willing to export its technology and materiel.
Less disruptive, we cannot afford to forget that Israel, India and Pakistan also possess nuclear capability. All are in stressed security environments. Israel is in conflict now. India and China contest a border in the Himalayas. And Pakistan—its procurement of a nuclear capability assisted by China—is a weak state, with weak borders and an ongoing dispute with India.
All of which raises the prospect of further breakout proliferation. As with other developments in the geostrategic environment, we should not assume that such change is some time off or will be readily identified or occur at a leisurely pace. Recall the pace at which Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapon after India’s acquisition[1]—states can move quickly given the right incentive. And the levels of readily available skills and technologies are increasing—nuclear latency[2] is rising, whether through hedging or hiding, making a nuclear tipping point increasingly likely.
Already, the calculus around deterrence is difficult for the United States—the complexity and chaos of a three-plus body problem. As Narang infers, one means of managing that complexity, and imbuing allies with more certainty and reassurance, is to coalesce around common purpose and shared capability.
Australian security against nuclear threats depends on the integrity, reliability and robustness of US nuclear capability and its ability and willingness to extend its nuclear umbrella to Australia. It is in our interests to help the United States in that task. Such is the rationale for our hosting of the Pine Gap Joint Defence Facility, our readiness to accept nuclear ship visits, and for the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor, which provides Australian nuclear scientists and engineers with access to the nuclear fuel cycle.
At a time when there is increasing uncertainty of future US commitment to allies, Australia can—and needs—to do more. That is especially so as Australian policy, intelligence and technical understanding of nuclear strategy, deterrence and capability was only ever imbued in a few individuals, and the knowledge has faded after the end of the Cold War.
Australia first needs to build skills and understanding in strategy, governance and the technology of nuclear weapons. This is not a military task alone—expertise is needed to strengthen civilian understanding and political decision-making. Nor can we rely on simply exhuming past practice and expertise: the rules and conditions of the Cold War no longer apply.
Such skills are needed to engage seriously and contribute to discussions with the United States and like-minded allies on how best to support and strengthen US extended deterrence. The United States has established a Nuclear Consultative Group with South Korea and an Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan. Australia should seek the same—if we can seriously contribute, not simply listen, and have robust, well thought-through positions. In the defence policy talks Australia has in place with the United States, extended deterrence is but one of a broader range of topics, and easily subsumed.
Discussion on nuclear-powered submarines and the industrial and regulatory aspects of these are not a dialogue on extended nuclear deterrence, which is about strategy, policy, decision making, capability, weapons and war.
Aside from knowledge and expertise about strategy and capability, there are other mind shifts to be made and new capacity to be grown. Arms control, for example, similarly reflects a world that no longer exists. Work needs to be undertaken as to how to manage possible breakthrough proliferation in a multipolar world characterised by rising mistrust. Key steps include identifying existing instruments that may impede necessary flexibility, capability development and then creating new approaches. Working to ensure willing partners—there are few successful unilateral arrangements in arms control—is another.
Last, nuclear weapons are a unique deterrent, not replicable through other means. But strategic deterrence may be strengthened through conventional and unconventional capabilities. Australia will need to assess its capability mix against the needs of extended deterrence in multipolar world, how it can strengthen US and allied extended deterrence, and how it can best offset the potential fraying or failure of extended deterrence. Capable nuclear-powered but conventionally armed submarines are relevant but fall well short of a defining factor here.
Australia can no longer afford to ignore such debates. Nor can it deflect confronting the changing state of geostrategic need through references to the arms control measures or assumptions of reliance of US extended deterrence of past eras. The conditions that enabled those—bi- or unipolarity and a global rules-based order—are gone.
[1] While India conducted its first test in 1974, it only formalised a nuclear weapons capability in May 1998, testing five weapons including a thermonuclear device. Only a few weeks later, Pakistan conducted its first six nuclear weapons tests, albeit after some years of hidden development.
[2] Nuclear latency includes both growth in nuclear skills and growth in numbers of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles.