Israel vs Iran, JNIM and Australia's dependence
Two spotlight areas and one quieter ones, all with potentially long aftereffects...
…what a fortnight. No doubt you've been reading about and keeping up to date with the situation between Israel and Iran: we have a few thoughts about the wider situation it presents the Middle East. We’ll then turn to western Africa, where a growing Islamist power is presenting concerns for anti-terrorism planners around the globe. And in Australia – we are based there – Amazon’s latest investment to data centres speaks volumes about Australia’s inability to wean itself off reliance on foreign multinationals.
Israel vs Iran – Iran’s tenuous position
We’re not planning to go deep into retreading over events as they unfolded, not least as both Israel and Iran lobbed vitriol, alongside the missiles, bombs and drones, at each other. Here, we're focusing on two factors:
Israel's apparent ongoing depth and strength in nonconventional strikes.
What Israel's capacity and leading tech may herald for the broader region.
So even as Iran threw wave after wave of missiles and drones at Israel, steadily battering Israel’s famed Iron Dome – reports show it found at least some success – Israel’s strikes have been far more calculated and effective.
Israel is showing an ability to inflict damage with a sophistication rarely seen even by the best militaries. While the pager explosives incident targeting Hezbollah may have been viewed as a rare one-off at the time, Israel has shown an ability to keep such attacks in play even against more organised and regimented threats. Israel knew its targets within Ayatollah Khamenei’s inner circle, and have successfully targeted replacement appointments in recent days.
Such sophistication – as well as integration with intelligence units – will be noted globally, especially as a wider range of skills are coming into play on the battlefield. Software, cyber warfare, single-use drones and sensing capabilities are all playing greater roles than many traditional practices have employed. And while non-state actors have found success, it has often been in short bursts; they've been unable to sustain momentum. That Israel is showing a depth of preparation in such capabilities speaks to a long-term and broad approach to the intelligence such opportunities require.
This conflict marks a shift to the kinetic between two of the power players in the Middle East; the type of conflagration that has been largely avoided since the early 2000s. Iran still has many proxies and clients, from the Houthis, as well as Shia-militias in Iraq. Central Asian countries and groups are much less warm towards the Iranian clerics. Israel clearly has the backing of the United States, and somewhat agreeable arrangements with neighbouring Egypt and Jordan. However, Israeli relations with Turkey have soured, and long-standing supporters in Europe are openly critical about Gaza. And neither leader – Khamenei nor Netanyahu – seems to have the wholehearted support of their citizens, though on balance, Israel has the upper hand on which nation has stability of its executive power.
However! The above were our thoughts before the United States became directly involved, via Operation Midnight Hammer on 22 June 2025 (local), which brought in an entirely different level of consideration. President Trump authorised 14 bunker-buster bombs and 24 Tomahawk cruise missiles to be deployed on three Iranian nuclear sites at Isfahan, Natanz and Fordo (also spelled Fordow).
Verification of the damage the US attack managed to inflict on Iran's nuclear programs is unclear – as is Iran's timeline for achieving a deployable nuclear weapon, if adjusted. A number of independent commentators argue that this is likely only a set back for Iran's nuclear program, even though destruction or significant damage to nuclear centrifuges will slow them significantly.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed that Iran has possession of over 400 kilograms of uranium-235, but Iran's nuclear site at Fordo was critical to its uranium enrichment program, focusing on enrichment up to 60 per cent. Weapons-grade uranium-235 requires about 90 per cent enrichment to be viable, especially with the design specifications that come with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMBs), as opposed to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki devices.
Which brings us to the other measure of nuclear weapons capability that the United States – or Israel – could target: limiting Iran's deployment methods. While Iran's regime is aligned with two autocratic states that can support its missile design in China and Russia1, neither have expressed an overt intent to involve themselves in the Middle East's latest strategic development.
Iran retains much of the knowledge and nuclear latencies to continue pushing its program forward, even if at a slower rate than before. But Iran's regime remains in a perilously dangerous position – despite the ceasefire – and the prospect that highly-enriched nuclear material will reach militias, rogue actors or terrorist groups would be a worrying development.
JNIM – A growing Islamist power across North Africa
Just before the news about Israel and Iran broke, news broke that PMC (Private Military Company) Wagner was withdrawing from Mali – not that this news received much coverage in Indo-Pacific and North American geographies. While they will be replaced by Russia's Africa Corps, Wagner’s withdrawal highlights the growth of an Islamist group, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), that is just as bad.
The JNIM is an al-Qa'ida-aligned Salafi-Jihadist movement, one of many that plague much of northern and western Africa, from Libya to the western coast and south into West African coastal countries such as Guinea, Benin and Togo. JNIM is considered the strongest militant group in the Sahel, carrying out coordinated attacks against military bases of both local and international forces.
And JNIM is showing an adaptability to exploit contextual strengths. Its usage of motorbikes allows them to rapidly cover the wide domain of its attacks2. It has also shown consistent access to drones, utilising them for both destructive kamikaze attacks and operational coordination. Such tactics for guerrilla warfare by militias and non-state actors are increasingly comparable to the advanced warfare capabilities of nation states.
JNIM and the insurgencies in north Africa, not to mention ongoing interstate conflict, are indicative of a growing geopolitical instability, enabled by civilian technologies re-purposed for coercion and violence, presenting Europe and the rest of Africa with new and urgent national security challenges. And the Islamist angle could ricochet elsewhere across North Africa, the Middle East and the sub-continent – and potentially Southeast Asia.
Others will be more concerned with the mineral resources in the area; West Africa and the Sahel have significant deposits of critical minerals. World powers have interests ranging from gold and bauxite – the most common source of aluminium – to lithium, manganese, gallium and tellurium, used in batteries and semiconductors. Access to mining some of these resources was likely featured in the arrangements between Russia and a number of West African and Sahel states to begin with.
But no one will have an easy resolution to offer, given the nation states of the region are unable to manage, or compete with, JNIM’s growth3. Its effects are clear in the emergence of military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, each fighting against JNIM and other terrorist groups. Those same juntas, often back by Wagner, pushed out French and American troops working to contain Islamist groups in the area; not the best opening for cooperation.
Australia – Continuing dependencies
Over the past few years, the Australian government has been promoting the need for greater sovereignty in Australian capabilities and domestic production, with the two headliners being its Future Made in Australia (FMIA) plan, focusing on renewable energy, and the National Reconstruction Fund (NRF). There's a strong sentiment in government favouring especially clean energy and critical minerals (yes, there's NRF funding for manufacturing for infrastructure, medical science, primary industries, mining and defence and enabling technologies) with defence-related needs being largely relegated to AUKUS, whether through the so-named Pillar I (a tightly held submarine project) or Pillar II (Defence's tightly held Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA)).
But Australia has consistently hit the snag that it seems incapable of walking the walk – on both sovereignty development and especially on AUKUS. Given the apparent rift that’s formed between the United States and Europe with the Trump administration, one could expect increasing alignment between the United States and Australia, especially given the focus on the Asia-Pacific apparent in Pentagon appointments – Elbridge Colby, the US Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, is a noted China hawk. But there appears to be a greater reliance on the part of the US in the ability and willingness of the United Kingdom and Europe to take their defences seriously, and deliver.
And now Elbridge Colby is reviewing AUKUS. Colby is a friend of Australia, but has had long-held concerns as to whether Australia is able to fulfill its role in AUKUS, especially the crewing and effective use of Virginia-class submarines at a time where the US has its own urgent needs for the platform. Further, the Albanese government's unwillingness to proactively contemplate a much-needed step-up to its defence budget will do little to reassure even to most pro-Australian advocates in the US Administration.
And while ASCA was launched in 2023, it has provided little in the way of a cohesive concept of a structured, strategic approach, let alone communicated it in a way that welcomes new opportunities through the door. With the departure of Professor Emily Hilder in February 2025, ASCA has had a direct change of leadership with the appointment of Brigadier Hugh Meggitt, subsequently promoted to Major General. That there's been a leadership shakeup around a year after the previous leader was confirmed, and that ASCA has been shifted to be firmly under the grip of the military, does not bode well.
Australia is flailing at developing domestic strengths and stepping up in an increasingly competitive and uncertain world, and it seems that partner countries are increasingly aware of it. Prime Minister Albanese pitched a key part of his approach to the G7 summit as a meeting with President Trump. Except that meeting was scrapped; President Trump chose to return to Washington to address the Israel-Iran situation. True, Australia’s prime minister wasn’t the only leader to be snubbed a meeting with the president of the US, but when President Trump gave calls to some of the other leaders in lieu of a meeting, Australia's Prime Minister wasn’t on his call list.
And going back further, prior to the G7 summit, Amazon announced it would be investing US$13 billion – A$20 billion – into Australian data centre infrastructure over the next four years. With data, privacy and software strengths – both peaceful and military – increasingly gaining the spotlight, Australia's ability to determine its own path forward as a nation seems to be slipping from its grasp. It has developed a reliance on initiatives funded and pushed by foreign multinationals – preferring easy options proffered like baubles by big tech vendors – undercutting the opportunities for and growth of Australia's own capabilities and economic depth4. Just as nations look to plunder Africa for its critical minerals, one could be forgiven for a sense that big tech is targeting Australia for easy money – Australia is a wealthy society – and its intellectual and data resources.
Others have been here before, and Australia could learn from them. For example, Japan and South Korea have pushed to build their own sovereign strengths: Japan with soft power, rail and cars, nuclear energy, and electronic manufacturing; South Korea with shipbuilding, consumer goods and cars, and more recent soft power growth. Both of them did so while being heavily dependent on the United States following World War II and the Korean War respectively. Another is Oman: it is still developing sovereign economic depth and has managed to leverage large multi-nationals for short-term builds in oil and gas. But crucially it is diversifying into manufacturing, technology and tourism, while raising standards in education and female employment.
Australia talks like it knows these lessons, but doesn't seem to take them onboard. Anthony Albanese's post-election policy focus on productivity – while admirable – misses key points in diversifying and adapting Australia's economy and enabling Australia's homegrown options within that focus, even as large multinationals reap the rewards.
China has played a significant role in supporting the development of Pakistan's nuclear program since the 1970s, showing they're open to nuclear proliferation if they wish. Both Russia and China made public statements criticising the US attack, and ties between the two countries and Iran will undoubtedly continue on some level, but it is likely that Khamenei would have expected more direct support.
Motorbikes make sense for the JNIM contextually as well; motorbikes are in wide usage in the area, can be repaired cheaply, are more fuel-efficient, and operate in poor road conditions. And restricting motorbikes in the region would have wider negative effects for the populace, and trafficking channels for motorbikes have significant depth and resources.
Readers interested in deepening their understanding of just how prolific and influential militant and/ or syndicated politically motivated groups are becoming in Africa, as a window into a continent that seems to be setting itself up for myriad future challenges for the West, see: https://mapping-africa-transformations.org/?lang=en.
Is Amazon’s funding of data centres good without context? Yes. Is it good with context? It’s good for Amazon, but serves a case study of a continuing malaise with Australia’s efforts to achieve outcomes of self-sufficiency. And let's not forget the last time a big tech vendor was offered the opportunity for a photo-op with the Prime Minister: Microsoft's A$5 billion investment.